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Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective
Anne 0. Krueger* and Sean Hagan**

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the international community has devoted
considerable attention to improving arrangements for resolving financial crises
and, in particular, for the restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt. These
efforts have benefited from the active participation of sovereign debtors, market
participants, workout professionals, lawyers, economists and the "official
sector," including the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). As can be
expected, perspectives regarding the dimensions of the problem and the
direction of reform have varied. Nevertheless, a consensus appears to have been
reached on two broad issues. First, there is a recognition that, in circumstances
where a sovereign's debt has become unsustainable, all stakeholders-the
sovereign debtor, its creditors, and the system more generally-will benefit from
a restructuring process that is more rapid, orderly, and predictable than is
currently the case. Second, it is generally accepted that enhancing the
effectiveness of the legal framework is critical to the success of any meaningful
reform in this area.
Much of the discussion has focused on whether the necessary
strengthening of the legal framework can be achieved exclusively through private
contract or, alternatively, requires official intervention, perhaps in the form of
the IMF's proposed "Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism" ("SDRM'). 1
Market participants have expressed concern that any form of official
intervention would undermine the operation of capital markets in this area and,
First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. The views set forth in this
article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMF.
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See, for example, Anne Krueger, IMF First Deputy Managing Director, New Approaches to Sovereign
Debt Restructuring:An Update on Our Thinking, Remarks at the Institute for International Economics
Conference on Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards (Apr 1, 2002), transcript available
online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm>
(visited Mar 24,

2005).

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

in particular, the quality of emerging market debt as an asset class. In contrast,
the premise behind the SDRM has been that official intervention, if
appropriately designed, would strengthen rather than weaken the operation of
the international financial system. While recognizing the important limits of the
analogy, supporters of official intervention have pointed to3 the critical role that
domestic insolvency frameworks play in a market economy.
While there has been considerable support for the SDRM within the
official sector, efforts are currently underway to improve the restructuring
process through market-based reform and, in particular, through a reliance on
the collective action clauses that are found in international sovereign bonds.
Whether the official sector turns its attention again to the SDRM will depend, at
least in part, on whether these clauses are sufficiently robust to limit the severity
of the costs that arise from the restructuring process.
This article provides a brief overview of the key economic, financial and
legal issues that have been central to the discussions in this area. Section II
identifies the problems faced by a sovereign and its creditors when the
restructuring of the sovereign's debt becomes inevitable and, in that context,
discusses the assistance the IMF can-and cannot-provide in these situations.
Section III sets forth a brief analysis of the two primary proposals for legal
reform: collective action clauses and the SDRM. Section IV offers some
concluding observations.
II. THE PROBLEM
While a sovereign debtor and its creditors share a common interest in an
early and rapid restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt, developments in
the international financial system have conspired to make this a more
complicated and time consuming process than it need be. In some respects, the
2

See Michael M. Philips, Support Buildsfor Plan to Ease Debt Loads of Developing Nations, Wall St J A 16
(Sept 17, 2002) (quoting Charles Dallara, Managing Director for the Institute of International
Finance, as saying "at a time of extreme risk-aversion in emerging markets, when capital flows are
falling... approaches such as [the SDRM] add further to uncertainty and investor anxiety").

3

For an analysis of the relevance of corporate reorganization legislation to the restructuring of
sovereign debt, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankrupt{7 Reorganiation
Approach, 85 Cornell L Rev 956 (2001); Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutoy Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: Lessons from Coeporate Bankruptsy Practice Around the World, 50 IMF Staff Papers 41

(2003),
available
online
at
<http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2002/0000/pdf/bolton.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2005); Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black
Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankrupty Framework Be Structured?, 53 Emory L J 763, 773-74 (2004);
Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptiy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Ind L 103, 123-26 (2003); and
Michelle J. White, Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankrpty? (2002), Paper for the Brookings
Panel on Economic Activity, available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/
es/commentary/joumals/bpea.macro/papers/200204_white.pdf > (visited Mar 24, 2005).
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problem is similar to the one confronted by a company and its creditors seeking
to maximize value in an environment where debt structures are increasingly
complex and creditor interests diverse. Of course, the corporate analogy only
holds at a certain level of abstraction. There are a number of distinguishing
features that have important effects on the process-most importantly, creditors
and corporate debtors engage in the restructuring process in the shadow of
liquidation. 4 The "liquidation" alternative shapes not only the debtor-creditor
relationship, but also the intercreditor dynamic, given the fact that a liquidation
law defines the relative priorities among creditors. Nevertheless, the experience
in the corporate context reveals that, as with corporations, once a judgment is
made that a sovereign debtor will not be able to service its claims without a
reduction in the net present value of the claims, everyone has an interest in
initiating the process earlier rather than later. Moreover, all will gain from a
process that, once initiated, is rapid, orderly, and predictable.
A. UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In the corporate context, a distinction is generally made between
"illiquidity" and "insolvency." A company is considered "illiquid" when it is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due, but is "insolvent" when the value of its
liabilities exceeds the value of its assets.5 While the former concept focuses on
problems arising from the structure of the company's debts, the latter addresses
problems relating to the size of the overall stock. This distinction has a number
of implications in how the corporate restructuring process will proceed. In either
case, however, some form of statutory protection will be needed since, even if

4

5

Although insolvency laws vary considerably among countries, over the past several years it has
become increasingly possible to identify emerging "standards" and best practices in this area.
Perhaps most significantly, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") recently adopted the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, which provides
detailed analysis and recommendations on all aspects of the design of an insolvency law.
UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolveny Law (2004), available online at
(visited Mar 24, 2005). This
<http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/insolven/insoguide.pdf>
work builds upon work that has been done by a variety of international organizations, including
that of the IMF and the World Bank. See also IMF Legal Department, Ordery & Effective Insolvency
Procedures:Ky Issues (1999), available online at <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/orderly/>
(visited Mar 24, 2005) and World Bank, Ptindples and Guidelines for Effective Insolveny and Creditor
Rights Systems (2001), available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/
PrinciplesAndGuidelines/20162797/Principles%20and%20Guidelines%20for/o20Effective%20I
0
nsolvency/o2Oand /20Creditor%/20Rights'/o20Systems.pdf> (visited on Mar 24, 2005).
In the corporate context, the illiquidity standard is also referred to as the "cash flow" or
"cessation of payments" standard; see UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law at 57 (cited in
note 4). Regarding insolvency, as a general matter, the United States Bankruptcy Code defines a
company as insolvent if "the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property, at a fair valuation." 11 USC § 101 (32)(A) (2000).
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the problem can be resolved by a reprofiling of maturities rather than a
reduction of maturities, the inability of a company to make payments will result
in an enforcement of legal claims and the dismemberment of the debtor.
The corporate analogy does not translate directly to the sovereign context.
A sovereign has choices available to it that are normally unavailable to a
company that is facing a liquidity crisis. Among other things, it has the IMF.
There will always be circumstances where, as a result of changes in external
circumstances (a sharp and unanticipated drop in the price of a key export, for
example), a sovereign will find it difficult to service its debt under the original
terms. In many cases, the adoption of strong economic policies will provide a
sufficient basis for weathering the crisis: even if a reprofiling of maturities is
necessary, the net present value of the debt will be maintained and the future
debt-to-GDP ratio will stabilize or fall. In these circumstances, the IMF can play
a critical "catalytic" role by providing its financial resources in support of strong
economic adjustment policies, thereby assisting the country to regain market
confidence.
There may be circumstances, however, where, under any reasonable set of
circumstances or policies, the sovereign's debt relative to GDP will grow
indefinitely. A sovereign will never be "insolvent" in the strict sense: by virtue of
its fiscal powers, a sovereign's assets are-at least theoretically-inexhaustible.6
However, at a certain point, its debt will become "unsustainable." Specifically, as
the ratio of debt-to-GDP mounts, real interest rates in the debtor country will
rise. While the sovereign may try to increase taxes or take other measures to
service its debt, all of these measures will be growth reducing. As growth falters,
the debt-to-GDP ratio will rise further. Of course, judgments as to debt
unsustainability must be made on a probabilistic basis. There is always the
possibility, however remote, that new natural resources will be discovered or
that the terms of trade will shift in a country's favor. However, as borrowing
continues, the probability of the sovereign being able to continue to service its
claims will continue to drop. As lenders see that debt sustainability is
increasingly improbable, they will no longer be willing to provide financing-at
any price.
In these circumstances, the IMF will not be able to help unless the
sovereign takes steps to restructure its debt in a manner that reduces the debt's
net present value to a level that assures medium term sustainability. According to
6

A number of commentators have recognized the difficulty of determining when indebtedness is
unsustainable in the sovereign context. See Richard N. Cooper, Chapter 11 for Countries?, 81
Foreign Aff 90, 92 (2002); see also Nouriel Roubini, Do We Need a New Bankrpty Regime?, 1
Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 321, 322 (2002), abstract available at <http://
static.highbeam.com/b/brookingspapersoneconomicactivity/march222002/doweneedanewbankr
uptcyregime/> (visited Mar 24, 2005); Scott, 37 Intl L 103 (cited in note 3).

Vol. 6 No. 1

Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective

Krueger &yHagan

its charter, the IMF may only make its resources available to member countries
if it determines that its assistance will actually assist the member in the resolution
of its balance of payments problems.' Moreover, as a financial institution with
limited resources, the IMF must have adequate confidence that the member will
be in a position to repay the Fund within the relatively short repayment period
(normally 3-5 years) that applies to its financing.' But when the IMF has made a
judgment that a member's debt is unsustainable, its financing will only serve to
delay-and exacerbate-the resolution of the problem unless efforts are made
by the sovereign to both restructure its debt and implement effective adjustment
policies that provide for medium term sustainability. In addition, in the absence
of a reduction in the net present value of the claims on the sovereign, the IMF
will have little basis to conclude that it will get repaid.
From the perspective of the borrower, there comes a point where further
delays in the initiation of the restructuring process only exacerbate the economic
dislocation that occurs when the crisis arises. Since the debt restructuring
process is always a painful one for a sovereign (both economically and
politically), governments are often tempted to introduce whatever economic
adjustment efforts they think necessary to avoid a restructuring; in other words,
they try to "gamble for resurrection." But after a certain point, these steps only
reduce the policy options that are available when the debt restructuring process
begins. Moreover, a desperate wave of borrowing from domestic banks when all
other sources of credit have dried up only leaves the domestic banking system
insolvent when the net present value of the banks' claims on the government is
reduced. The ensuing recapitalization of the banking system places an even
greater strain on the sovereign's fiscal policies.
Finally, there is the perspective of the sovereign's creditors. Actions taken
by the sovereign government to delay the restructuring process and "gamble for
resurrection" ultimately reduce value of creditor claims. To the extent that these
delays serve to exacerbate the economic dislocation, this will effectively reduce
the amounts that are available to service restructured claims. Perhaps even more
directly, additional borrowing from the IMF-which, by virtue of its preferred

7

See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (1944), art V, § 3(a), available
online at <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aa/aa05.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2005)
(hereinafter IMF Agreement) which states:
The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including
policies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies
for special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve
their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions
of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.

8

Id, art V, § 7(c).
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creditor status is excluded from the debt restructuring process-will only further
dilute the claims of existing creditors.
B. THE BARRIERS TO RESTRUCTURING
There is usually a brief period between the point at which it is highly
probable that a sovereign's debt is unsustainable and the outset of a full blown
crisis. This period presents a window of opportunity in which it may be possible
to reach an agreement on a restructuring that offers the prospect of restoring
sustainability while limiting the scale of economic dislocation and preserving the
value of creditor claims. At this point, the net present value of the debtor's
primary fiscal surplus will be larger if the debt is restructured since the
economy's growth prospects can increase and real interest rates can fall. In these
circumstances, an orderly and prompt restructuring can create value for both
creditors and the debtor. Moreover, at this juncture, the IMF can provide
financing in support of the implementation of strong adjustment policies during
the debt restructuring process. Experience demonstrates, however, that there are
a number of reasons why the restructuring process, once initiated, is more costly
than it need be for the sovereign debtor, its creditors and the system more
generally. The two most important reasons are briefly discussed below.
1. The Policies of the Sovereign Debtor
As noted earlier, once the restructuring process is initiated, it is critical that
the sovereign formulate and implement a set of economic policies that will
provide a basis for achieving medium-term balance of payments viability. In the
absence of such policies, creditors will have no confidence in the country's
payment capacity and, somewhat understandably, will be unwilling to engage in
restructuring negotiations. In addition to these substantive economic policies, it
is also critical for the sovereign to take steps to establish a collaborative debt

restructuring process with its creditors. Unfortunately, there is
perception among creditors that sovereign debtors will often
collaborative process and, instead, will launch "take-it-or-leave-it"
offers without providing creditors with the information necessary
them to make informed decisions.9 Even where such an approach is

a general
eschew a
exchange
to enable
successful

in attracting a critical mass of support, it risks undermining the operation of the

international financial system generally, and the value of emerging market debt
as an asset class more specifically. For example, while this approach may be of
9

The approach relied upon by Ecuador to restructure its Brady bonds and Eurobonds from 1999
to 2000 generated considerable criticism in that regard. For a discussion of investors' concerns
regarding the process that was relied upon by Ecuador to restructure its bonds, see Felix Salmon
and Jorge Galardo, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back, 384 Euromoney 46 (Apr 2001).
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benefit to distressed debt purchasers (who buy the debt at a steep discount as
uncertainty regarding the restructuring process drives down secondary market
prices), it is very problematic for those investors who extended the credit in the
first place and continue to hold the claims at face value. 0
2. Collective Action Problems
Even where the sovereign is implementing appropriate policies and is
intent on engaging with its creditors in a collaborative manner, its ability to
attract a critical mass of support among creditors may be undermined by
problems of collective action. Specifically, creditors who would otherwise be
willing to reach an agreement with the debtor will hesitate to do so out of
concern that other creditors will hold out and, after the agreement has been
reached, press for full payment on the original terms. Increased uncertainty as to
whether a critical mass of creditors will support the restructuring will, in turn,
make a sovereign even more reluctant to initiate the process, leading to further
delays and, accordingly, a further loss of economic value.
The magnitude of collective action problems currently facing a sovereign
have increased with the evolution of capital markets over the past twenty years.
During the 1980s, the claims being restructured were largely held by commercial
banks in the form of syndicated loans." The debt restructuring process, while
protracted, was relatively orderly, with negotiations being led by bank steering
committees. Although these banks were not always cooperative, the official
sector was generally successful in influencing their behavior through the
subtle-and sometimes not so subtle-use of regulatory authority. Moreover,
given the extensive business that these banks had with the debtor governments
and their residents, they understood that aggressive tactics would only
undermine these long term relationships.
Over the past fifteen years, however, emerging market sovereigns have
been able to access capital markets directly though the issuance of international
10

For a discussion of potential implications of the strategy relied upon by Ecuador, see IMF Policy
Development and Review and Legal Departments, Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of
Financial Crises-Restructuring InternationalSovereign Bonds 7 (2001), available online at <http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/ips.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2005). Interestingly, although
Pakistan had collective action clauses in its bonds, it decided not to use them when it restructured
its debt in 2000. Id at 5.

u

For a discussion of the debt crisis in the 1980s, see Lex Rieffel, RestructuringSovereign Debt: The Case
for Ad Hoc Machine7 149 (Brookings Inst 2003); William R. Cline, InternationalDebt: Systematic Riek
and Poligy Reiponse (Intl Inst Econ 1984); C.M. Watson and K.P. Riegling, History of the Debt CrisisCurrent Legal Issues Affecting CentralBanks (IMF 1984). With respect to the IMF's role during the
crisis, see James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The InternationalMonetary Fund 1979-1989 (IMF
2001); see also Sean Hagan, Sovereign Debtors, Private Creditors and the IMF in InternationalMonetary
and FinancialLaw in the New Millennium 49 (British Inst Intl & Comp L 2002).
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securities and, as a result, the relative importance of the commercial bank loans
as a source of financing has declined significantly. While the process of
disintermediation has resulted in a very large source of external financing for
these countries, it also presents considerable challenges if and when the
unsustainability of a sovereign's debt necessitates a restructuring. A debtor is
confronted with a relatively atomized creditor community, holding bonds issued
in a number of different jurisdictions. Perhaps even more importantly, the
interests of these creditors are often diverse. While retail investors and some
institutional creditors may hold the instruments at face value, others have
purchased the instruments at a steep discount. Many of these creditors are
unregulated and few have the type of long term relationship with the sovereign
that will guide their behavior. Rather, they pursue a strategy of maximizing the
value of their claims. 12 In some circumstances, they may determine that this
strategy is best implemented by participating in the debt restructuring. In other
circumstances, however, they may choose to hold out.
The nature of the holdout problem depends on whether the debt
restructuring precedes or follows a default. There are good reasons why a
sovereign may seek to restructure unsustainable debt prior to a default. A default
can trigger a crisis that causes major economic dislocation. For example, where
the banking system holds a considerable amount of sovereign debt, the plunge in
the secondary market of these claims caused by a default may result in an
insolvent banking system. Fear of such insolvency may also result in massive
capital flight, which only exacerbates the problem. For all these reasons,
creditors have a similar interest in engaging in a predefault restructuring. Not
only does the avoidance of a full blown crisis limit the decline in the value of
their claims, but it also increases the amount of resources available to the
sovereign to service its claims once they are restructured. Having to recapitalize
an insolvent banking system places an extraordinary amount of strain on the
sovereign's fiscal position.
Notwithstanding the commonality of interests among the sovereign and its
creditors, the holdout problem may be particularly acute in these circumstances;
a creditor contemplating a holdout strategy may calculate that, as long as a
critical mass of creditors accept the offer, the sovereign may be in a position to
service the original claims of those creditors that did not participate in the
restructuring-and may be tempted to do so as to avoid the reputation damage
12

For a discussion of the tactics and success rates of distressed debt purchasers, see Christopher C.
Wheeler and Amir Attaran, Dedawing the Vulture Funds: Rebabifitation of a Comiy Defense in Sovereign
Debt Lifigation, 39 Stan J Ind L 253, 268-70 (2003). For a general discussion, see Samuel E.
Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Holdouts in Sovereign Debt
Restructuting 5 UCLA J Ind & Foreign Aff 159 (2001-02); G. Mitu Gulati and Kenneth N. Klee,
Sovereign Piray,56 Bus Law 635 (2001).
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that a default may create. However, because of this possibility, creditors who
otherwise would have been interested in engaging in the restructuring may
decline to do so out of intercreditor equity considerations.
In the event that the restructuring process takes place after a default, the
credibility of the holdout strategy-and the degree to which it will undermine
the restructuring process-depends on the ability of the holdout to enforce its
claims against a sovereign. Enforcing one's claim against a sovereign, however, is
hardly a straightforward task. Although a sovereign borrowing in the
international capital markets is no longer protected by the concept of "absolute
sovereign immunity"-at least under the laws in those jurisdictions that typically
govern international debt instruments: usually New York state law or English
law-there are still considerable obstacles confronting a creditor that is seeking
recourse through the court system. 3 In particular, while obtaining a judgment
may be relatively easy, collecting on such a judgment has traditionally been very
difficult. In circumstances where the government itself is the borrower, the
assets of state-owned enterprises are normally not available for attachment.
Similarly, the reserves of the central bank are normally also immune from
attachment, provided that the central bank itself is not liable under the claim.
Confronted with the difficult task of finding assets of the sovereign to
attach, judgment creditors have recently sought to extract a recovery from a
sovereign by threatening to undermine the sovereign's relationship with its other
creditors. Relying on a court's injunctive power, creditors have sought-and
obtained-court orders that effectively preclude a debtors from servicing its
claims on its restructured debt unless it makes simultaneous and ratable
payments to the judgment creditor. This strategy was first used successfully by a
distressed debt purchaser against the Republic of Peru and has now been
replicated in other contexts. 14 There continues to be considerable uncertainty
regarding the legal basis of this strategy, in large part because there is doubt as to
whether the provision in the underlying agreement that has been used by the
distressed debt purchasers to effect this strategy in most, but not all, of the
cases-the pari passu clause-should, in fact, be interpreted to require
simultaneous and ratable payments. 5 Nevertheless, this strategy has exacerbated
13

For a discussion of the barriers confronting a creditor wishing to enforce its claim against a
sovereign, see Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to RestructureSovereign Debt, 36 Georgetown
J Intl L (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 11-15, on file with author).

14

Id at 12-15.

15

For an analysis of why it would be unreasonable to interpret the panipassu provision as limiting
payments, see Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 Emory L J 869 (2004). See also Philip R. Wood, PaniPassu Clauses-WhatDo They
Mean?, Butterworths J of Intl Bank & Fin L (Nov 2003); Gulati and Kee, 56 Bus Law 635 (cited
in note 12). The successful action taken by a distressed debt purchaser against Peru involved an
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the collective action problem facing a sovereign and its creditors in at least two
respects. First, to the extent that holdouts have a credible postdefault holdout
strategy, creditors who are otherwise willing to engage in the debt restructuring
process may be more reluctant to do so because of concerns regarding
intercreditor equity. Second, creditors contemplating whether to accept a
restructuring offer will clearly be concerned that the holdout strategy may be
used to interrupt payments to them once the debt has been restructured.
III. REFORMING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In recognition of the above problems, efforts have been made over the
past several years to strengthen the legal frameworks to restructure sovereign
debt. Two principal models have been pursued: one based on contract, the other
on a treaty-based framework that could be established through an amendment to
the IMF's Articles of Agreement. While there are important differences between
these two approaches, they are similar in important respects. First, both place a
priority on the resolution of collective action problems in a manner that does
not shift the leverage from creditors to the sovereign. Rather, they are designed
to shift the leverage from individual creditors to creditors as a group. Second,
both frameworks seek to enhance the predictability and quality of the dialogue
between the sovereign and its creditors during the restructuring process. Third,
by seeking to make the process orderly, predictable and rapid, both frameworks
are designed to enhance the quality of emerging market debt as an asset class.
Finally, neither purports to be a panacea. In the final analysis, the success of any
restructuring process will ultimately depend on the quality of the economic
policies being pursued by the sovereign.
A.

COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES

Notwithstanding the attention that collective action clauses have recently
received over the past several years, they are hardly a novel feature of
international sovereign bonds. Two types of provisions have been prevalent for
many years.16 The first is a provision that enables a qualified majority of
bondholders (typically 75 percent) to bind bondholders within the same issuance

16

order issued by a Belgian court against Euroclear. Belgium recently amended Article 9 of the law
that implements European Directive 98/26/EC for the purpose of ensuring that future court
orders do not prevent Euroclear from receiving and channeling payments on account of
bondholders; see Belgian Law 11/19/204, art 15.
For a comprehensive analysis of the origins of collective action clauses, see Lee C. Buchheit and
G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 Emory L J 1317, 1318-32 (2002). The
various features of collective action clauses are also analyzed in IMF Legal Department, The Design

and

Effectiveness

of

Collective

Action

Clauses

(IMF

2002),

available

online

at

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2005).
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to the payment term of the restructuring. This provision, normally referred to as
"majority amendment provisions" is a common feature in bonds governed by
the laws of England and Japan. Until recently, however, they have not been
included in bonds governed by the laws of New York. The second type of
provision, referred to as a "majority enforcement" provision, is designed to limit
the ability of a minority of bondholders to disrupt the restructuring process by
enforcing their claims after a default but prior to a restructuring agreement.
Elements of this provision can already be found in bonds governed by laws of
New York and England. Although experience with restructuring sovereign
bonds has been limited, the evidence suggests that collective action clauses can
play a valuable role in facilitating the resolution of financial crises. They were
successfully relied upon by the Ukraine in 1999 (in bonds governed by English
law) and Uruguay in 2003 (in bonds governed by the laws of Japan).
Over the past nine years, most of the efforts of the official community in
this area have been devoted to promoting the inclusion of majority amendment
provisions in bonds governed by New York law, which continue to constitute
the largest share of instruments used by emerging market sovereigns. Although
there are no legal impediments to the introduction of majority amendment
provisions in these bonds, there has been, until recently, very little appetite for
them in the private sector.17 The breakthrough came in early 2003, when Mexico
included such a provision in its New York law-governed bonds. Since then,
these provisions have become a standard feature of bonds issued under New
York law. How does one explain this reversal? As has been observed by some
commentators, market participants were finally willing to embrace collective
action out of a recognition that, unless progress was made regarding the
adoption of these clauses, the official sector was likely to press ahead with the
SDRM.
While the inclusion of these clauses in bonds governed by New York law
represents a major step forward, there is room for further progress. In a 2002
report issued by a working group formed by the G-10 ("G-10 Working Group
Report"), 8 two recommendations were made regarding the design of collective
action clauses that have yet to be fully implemented. While the first relates to the
use of trust deeds, the second involves the introduction of "representation"
17

The US Trust Indenture Act of 1939 prohibits any impairment of a bondholder's right to receive

18

payments due (or to recover the missed payments) without its consent, except that it allows a
majority of bondholders with 75 percent of outstanding principal to postpone interest payments
for up to three years. See 15 USC § 77 (2000). However, this limitation does not apply to
sovereign bonds. For further discussion, see Buchheit and Gulati, 51 Emory L J at 1326-30 (cited
in note 16).
Group of Ten, Report of the G-b0 Working Group on Contractual Clauses (Sept 26, 2002) available
online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/51/2501714.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2005).
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provisions. With respect to the first recommendation, certain bonds governed
by English law are issued under trust deeds, which give the trustee the right to
initiate legal proceedings on behalf of all bondholders. 9 The trustee is only
required to act if, among other things, it is requested to do so by the requisite
percentage of bondholders (typically more than 25 percent).20 Moreover, any
amounts recovered by the trustee must be distributed pro rata among all
bondholders.2' Such a de facto sharing provision creates an important
disincentive for a minority of bondholders to initiate litigation, even if they
control a sufficient amount of the bond issue to force the trustee to take action.
Unfortunately, however, the use of trust structures in the sovereign context is
still relatively uncommon for bonds governed by New York law.22 The second
recommendation-the adoption of the representation provision-is designed to
facilitate an early dialogue between bondholders and the sovereign in the context
of an emerging crisis. 23 Specifically, the provision would enable bondholders to
elect a representative with the authority to enter into restructuring discussions.
This representative would not have the authority to bind bondholders to the
terms of a restructuring agreement, however.24 To date, such "representation"
provisions have yet to become a common feature of international sovereign
bonds.
B. THE SDRM
The SDRM proposal developed by the IMF during the period from
November 2001 through April 2003 envisages the resolution of collective action
problems through a treaty-based framework. 25 As with collective action clauses,
the SDRM would enable a debtor and a qualified majority of its creditors to
make decisions that would be binding on the minority, including decisions
regarding the acceptance of the final restructuring terms. Unlike collective action
clauses, however, the SDRM envisages that, for voting purposes, claims would

19

Id at 6.

20

Id.
Id.

21
22

-

The bonds issued by Uruguay in the context of its recent debt restructuring represent a welcome

23

exception to this rule, See Ben Maiden, Uruguay Faces up to Challenges of Emerging Market Debt, 22
Intl Fin L Rev 10 (May 2003).
Group of Ten, Report of the G-1O Working Group on ContractualClauses at 2 (cited in note 18).

24

Id at 3.

25

The details of the final SDRM proposal are set forth in the attachment to IMF, Report of the
Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial Committee on a Statutoy Sovereign Debt
RestructuringMechanism (Apr 8, 2003), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/
2003/040803.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2005).
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be "aggregated" across different instruments, even in the absence of a
contractual framework that links these different instruments. Accordingly, the
majority needed to effect a restructuring that would be calculated on the basis of
all of the claims that would be covered by the restructuring, subject to rules
regarding classification. This approach draws on the design of corporate
insolvency laws where claims are also aggregated for voting purposes. In an
environment where a sovereign has issued a multiplicity of different debt
instruments in a variety of different jurisdictions, aggregation prevents creditors
from disrupting the restructuring process by, for example, establishing a
controlling position in a single bond issuance.26
The SDRM would also establish a comprehensive framework designed to
enhance the quality of dialogue during the restructuring process: both from the
debtor-creditor and intercreditor perspective. During the restructuring
negotiations, the sovereign debtor would be required to provide detailed
information to its creditors regarding both nature of its indebtedness and how it
intends to treat such indebtedness.2 7 In addition, the SDRM envisages the
creation of a representative creditors committee that would provide a focal point
for such negotiations.2 8
The premise behind the SDRM proposal was that, to the extent its
operation was sufficiently predictable, it would create incentives for debtors and
creditors to reach an agreement without having to rely on its actual use. The
aggregated voting provisions would encourage early creditor organization,
thereby laying the foundation for structured negotiations. Potential holdouts
would realize that, unless they were sufficiently flexible, the debtor and the
majority of creditors could use the mechanism to bind them to the terms of an
agreement. Ideally, the restructuring process would take place prior to a default,
thereby protecting asset values for the benefit of both the sovereign debtor and
its creditors. In both these respects, the SDRM could operate in a manner that is
similar to the "prepackaged bankruptcy proceedings" that are relied upon in the
corporate context in the United States.29
26

In terms of the resolution of collective action problems, the SDRM would also be more

27

comprehensive than collective action clauses by virtue of the fact that it would bind judgment
creditors: those creditors whose claims are no longer subject to the provisions of the underlying
contract by virtue of the fact that they had received a judgment against the sovereign from a court
of competent jurisdiction.
IMF, Report of the Managing Directorto the InternationalMonetagy and FinancialCommittee on a Statutory
Sovereign Debt RestructuringMechanism, § 5 (cited in note 25).

28

Id at § 8.
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Under the US Bankruptcy Code, the votes for a plan may be solicited and obtained prior to the
commencement of reorganization proceedings. 11 USC § 1126(b) (2000). For a discussion of
prepackaged and prenegotiated plans under Chapter 11, see Stephen H. Case and Mitchell A.
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C. THE ROLE OF THE IMF

As the SDRM proposal was developed, a number of complex design issues
were identified and, for the most part, resolved.3" Among those issues that
attracted the most attention were those that related to the role of the Fund in the

operation of the SDRM.
From the outset of the discussions regarding the design of the SDRM, it
was recognized that, given the central role the Fund currently plays in the

resolution of financial crisis, the IMF would be involved at each stage of the
SDRM's operation. A country facing debt service difficulties normally
approaches the Fund for financing in order to avoid a debt restructuring and the
associated economic, social and political disruption. As noted earlier, however,
when the Fund determines that a member country's debt is unsustainable, it is
precluded from providing financial support in the absence of adequate
assurances that the member's debt will be restructured in a manner that provides
for medium term sustainability. Consequently, the Fund's own decisions
regarding the availability of its resources often have a significant impact on
whether and when a member will initiate the restructuring process. To the extent

that the SDRM was successful in reducing the costs associated with the debt
restructuring process, it was recognized that establishing it would allow the Fund
to more easily resist the pressure to provide financing in those cases where there
was a very high likelihood that the member's debt was unsustainable.
Once the debt restructuring process begins, the negotiations between the
debtor and its creditors often take place against the backdrop of an IMFsupported program. Depending on the circumstances, this program may shape
the dialogue between the sovereign debtor and its creditors in two respects. In
terms of "process," where the member has already defaulted on its external
obligations, the Fund's policy on "lending into arrears" requires it to make a
determination, as a condition for future financing, that the member is making
good faith efforts to reach an agreement with its creditors.31 Regarding
substance, the program supported by the Fund typically-but not alwaysspecifies the fiscal and external adjustment path that provides the basis for

30

Harwood, Current Issues in Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization and Using the Federal
DeclaratoyJudgmentActfor InstantReorganizaions, 1991 Ann Surv Am L 75.
For a detailed discussion of the design of the SDRM proposal, see Hagan, Designing a Legal

31

Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt at 30-75 (cited in note 13).
Originally established in 1989, the lending into arrears policy enables the IMF to provide balance
of payments support to countries that are implementing a strong economic adjustment program
but have not yet reached agreement with their private creditors. As a condition for providing
financing in these circumstances, the IMF must make a determination that the member is making
a "good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors." See Selected Decisions and
Selected Documents of the InternationalMonetagy Fund305-11 (2003).
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medium term sustainability. This adjustment path determines, in rather broad
terms, the amount of resources available for debt service during the program
period. Accordingly, the terms of any debt restructuring would need to be
consistent with these program assumptions.
As the SDRM proposal was developed, the question arose as to whether
the central role that the Fund typically plays in the restructuring process should
be effectively codified under the new legal framework. In particular, would a
sovereign debtor's ability to activate the SDRM be made conditional upon the
IMF's determination that the member's debt was, in fact, unsustainable? On the
one hand, the need for some form of "gate keeper" was motivated out of a
concern regarding debtor moral hazard. There was a perceived risk that the
availability of an internationally sanctioned restructuring framework would
increase the domestic political pressure on governments to utilize it, even where
the member's debt was sustainable. On the other hand, concerns were expressed
about any framework that would enhance the Fund's legal authority in this area.
In the end, it was decided that IMF approval would not be a condition for
commencement. The moral hazard risk arising from a country's ability to
activate the SDRM on a unilateral basis was mitigated by the fact that, once
activated, the SDRM would not necessarily enhance the debtor's leverage over
its creditors. In particular, and unlike domestic insolvency laws, any stay on legal
enforcement would require creditor support, consistent with the approach relied
upon in collective action clauses.32
CONCLUSIONS
Ever since the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises in the mid 1990s, efforts
have been underway to find means for more effective prevention of financial
crises. Much has been achieved in this area: exchange rate flexibility is much
32

A separate issue regarding the role of the IMF under the SDRM proposal relates to the dispute
resolution process. It was recognized from the outset that the aggregation of claims for voting
purposes would necessitate the establishment of some centralized dispute resolution process that
would oversee the implementation of the SDRM. As in the corporate context, it is inevitable that
the disputes would arise between the debtor and its creditors--or among creditors-regarding the
value or validity of claims being submitted. However, while the SDRM would be established
through an amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, there was a consensus that the
existing organs of the IMF-and, in particular, the IMF's Executive Board-could not perform
this function. It was agreed that a new, independent organ would be established to administer the
SDRM, called the Dispute Resolution Forum ("DRF'). Drawing on the considerable precedent in
the international law area, the members of the DRF would be selected through a process that
relied upon external associations and institutions with demonstrated expertise in this area, thereby
ensuring both their qualifications and independence. See IMF, Report of the Managing Directorto the
InternationalMonetary and FinancialCommittee on a Statutory Sovereign Debt RestructuringMechanism, § 8
(cited in note 25). See also Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt (cited in
note 13).
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greater than it was and there is increased transparency and improved oversight
of the financial system. More generally, greater attention is paid to unsustainable
policy stances. But no matter how much is done, crises will, on occasion,
continue to occur. Moreover, these crises will always be painful for the
sovereign, irrespective of the success of any reform efforts. Nevertheless, it has
become clear that, as result of developments in the capital markets over the past
twenty years, the restructuring process has become more painful than it need be.
In particular, uncertainties created by problems of collective action give a
sovereign with unsustainable debt an additional reason to delay the initiation of
the debt restructuring process. However, such delays only exacerbate the
economic dislocation that eventually occurs, while further eroding the value of
creditor claims. Accordingly, the objective of any reform of the legal framework
is to create incentives for a sovereign and its creditors to initiate the
restructuring of unsustainable debt as early as possible. For the moment, the
international community is focusing on solutions that are based on contract. Our
experience with future crises will tell us whether more robust, statute-based
reform, is necessary. Whichever approach is adopted, the success of any
restructuring exercise will ultimately depend on the ability of sovereigns to
formulate and implement effective economic policies during this difficult period.
The IMF's role will continue to be that of providing timely financial support for
such policies.
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